As Ukraine continues to fight the full-scale Russian invasion, the resilience of its people stands in stark contrast to the forces arrayed against them. Emily Channell-Justice, Director of the Temerty Contemporary Ukraine Program at Harvard University, delves into the underpinnings of this resilience, shedding light on the unbreakable spirit born out of the 2014 Euromaidan protests. With her keen anthropological insights, she explores how the nation’s past and present struggles could redefine not just Ukraine, but also our understanding of political activism, the role of the state, and democracy in a post-Soviet world.
Nadiia Chervinska
What initially drove you to study the Euromaidan protests and why did you choose to focus on volunteering and activism?
Emily Channell-Justice
I was interested in higher education activism in the late 2000s, particularly in the organization Priama Diya (Direct Action), which has had multiple different waves of activism. I wanted to study the different branches of the organization in different parts of Ukraine. Originally I had a plan to do research in Kyiv, Lviv, Odessa, Khmelnytsky, and Simferopol. I started my research in 2012 and came to Ukraine for long-term field work in September 2013. I was doing interviews with student activists, learning about their campaigns and attending a couple of different demonstrations at universities. When the Euromaidan protests started in November, these activists were obviously interested and engaged in what was going on. I followed them around the protests, documenting what I saw.
What was interesting to me was how people who were critical of EU accession and strongly nationalist narratives still wanted to participate in these protests. How could they find the space to participate? And what does that tell us about these protests? Because, as you probably also know, the analysis abroad was saying that the protest was organized by right wing groups, or that it’s an American funded coup. The fact that these anarchists and leftists were organizing something every single day and that they knew they had to be a part of this protest, tells us that the protests themselves are actually far more complicated.
This snowballed into a bigger study about volunteering and self-activism. All of these things are rooted in the Euromaidan protests, and how they come up is really essential to understand in the longer term, after Maidan.
Nadiia Chervinska
When talking about the Euromaidan, you emphasize the complexity of the protest, countering the image of unified goals among protesters. You show that the activities of leftist groups played a significant role in advocating self-organization as a response to state violence. You explore how these leftists and their actions were influenced by global anti-capitalist movements like Occupy. What were the potential implications of the connection between Ukrainian leftists and global anti-capitalist movements? How did the ideologies and organizational structures of leftist groups like Priama Diia evolve after the Euromaidan protests, especially in the context of the full-scale invasion?
Emily Channell-Justice
I was doing my PhD in New York City in 2011, so I actually was very much surrounded by Occupy Wall Street. I visited the protest camp and was obviously really engaged with Occupy when it was happening, although I wasn’t a central activist. And that was actually one of the key ways that I was introduced to Ukrainian leftist activists.
In a student organizing camp in Crimea in 2012, I did a presentation on Occupy which was of interest to them not only because of the tactics, but also in relation to state violence, the role of the police, and also how the goals of those protests were formed and shifted. I found that this group of leftist activists wanted (US) American, North American, and European leftist groups to take them seriously, and they often didn’t. It was really hard for the Ukrainians to find that they were not being listened to by leftists in the West. They had connections and participated in some kind of global exchanges, and if there was a big anarchist event, people would go. But for the most part, I found that they really just didn’t feel like they were considered to be a part of the conversation.
Which is why, I think, at that time there was so much connection with Russian activists. The camp of activists in Crimea was about half and half — half Ukrainians and half Russians. That solidarity between those two types of groups of leftists from Ukraine and from Russia was really important because of the exchange of ideas and tactics. Remember, this is 2012, right? This is during the encroaching authoritarianism of Yanukovych. It was also very important for these Ukrainians to think about how to remain politically active in a context where protesting was increasingly dangerous. For the most part, those solidarities have ceased to exist. Ukrainians who previously found a really important connection with Russian activists no longer feel that connection, which is obviously more than fair.
Maidan was a really difficult and stressful time for everybody who participated. During the protests, there was a lot of disagreement within the leftist group about what they should be doing. A lot of that was around the question of violence; many leftists positioned themselves as totally non-violent and others were willing to use violence. At that moment they decided to take the action that they felt they could most suitably take. But, after the end of the protests, and especially when the war started in 2014, it became very difficult for leftists to find a common position. Some of that was because they couldn’t come up with a unified anti-war position. There was a fragmentation among leftists but the most active people found ways to focus their energy on specific things that they wanted to work on rather than trying to fight over many different issues.
Right in the very early parts of the war, there was a moment when some leftists took seriously the possibility of separatist autonomy as a potential anti-state action. But as soon as they discovered that it would be held in a manner consistent with pro-Russian orthodox beliefs and traditional values, they refused the idea. There was also an anti-war camp that held the position that the Ukrainian government was fighting a war, and because the leftists were fighting the state, they didn’t support the war. But there was a much bigger group of leftists who said that they were going to help Ukraine fight in the war because they didn’t want people to die. This led to the growth of anarcho-nationalist groups who are strongly in favor of fighting an imperialist force, which is the way that they had been characterizing Russia for a long time. This is the question my book ends up with — how leftists justified some of their participation in the war effort. The war effort is largely about self-organization because the Ukrainian military doesn’t have enough resources. The organizing principle of these leftists is, “If you have the capacity to do something that needs to be done, you do it.”
Nadiia Chervinska
You highlight the leftists’ critical view of Ukraine’s relationship with the European Union, emphasizing their demand for a relationship that allows Ukrainians to assert themselves, rather than only comply with the EU expectations. Could you elaborate on the leftists’ critical view of Ukraine’s relationship with the EU? How do you see this relationship evolving since 2014, and what may the connection between Ukraine and the EU look like in the future?
Emily Channell-Justice
One of the things that leftist movements are articulating is that global capitalism is inherently hierarchical. If the European Union is a globally capitalist institution, it’s also going to be hierarchical. Ukrainian leftists are fearful that Ukraine will become the lowest ranking member of the EU, and therefore the benefits of the EU membership won’t really apply, as they are concentrated in the hands of people who are already powerful, either economically or politically.
What does that do for the average Ukrainian whose standard of living is dramatically lower than a person in France or Germany? How long are Ukrainians supposed to wait to see some kind of benefits? To what degree do they get stuck in this permanent hierarchy where they’re always producing for someone else’s consumption, and what’s the benefit of that? The difficulty for leftists was to articulate these questions as a criticism of the EU that would not get interpreted as pro-Russian. They were not pro-Russian in any sense. I have had this fight before many times; no matter how much I emphasize it in my book, somebody is always suggesting that they are nostalgic about Soviet times and want Ukraine to be part of Russia — they are absolutely not, and they are very careful to articulate that they are not. It is an indication of how difficult it is for people to listen to Ukrainians who are telling them exactly what their position is, if this position does not fit into any kind of preconceived place. Leftists know that Ukraine is not going to be the biggest member of the EU but they are asking for a non hierarchical relationship with the EU. What they suggest is to not just acquiesce to every single thing that the EU tells Ukraine to do but to negotiate a deal that is also beneficial to Ukraine. They remained critical of what European integration would look like but more in terms of economic reasons. However, they are more positive on some of the legal sides, such as anti-discrimination legislation, protections for LGBTQ+ people, more rights and representation for women. A lot of principles that leftists support are theoretically legislated in the EU. Implementing them is really impossible when Russia is right here trying to tell Ukrainians that they can’t exist. The war years have pushed leftists towards looking at European models for solidarity and trying to find a third way of association that they can advocate for.
I think that partly because the Maidan protests became about something other than Europe, leftists continued to participate in them. Since the annexation of Crimea and the first invasion in 2014, their position has evolved and they have taken more proactive recognition of the importance of associating with the EU. Partly because it also, if nothing else, is a symbolic distinction that Ukraine is not Russia.
Nadiia Chervinska
During the Euromaidan protest, and later after the full-scale invasion, we have seen a wave of self-organization in which volunteers have filled gaps where the state has failed to provide certain services, such as support for military action or humanitarian efforts. Some interpret this as a sign that Ukraine is a failed state. Yet, you arrived at the opposite conclusion, arguing that this is actually a proof of Ukraine’s alignment with European-style democracy, rather than a failure of the state. How does the increase in self-organization and activism relate to Ukraine’s alignment with European values and what implications does it have for Ukraine’s future in the EU? How does it influence the current post-Maidan state of governance in Ukraine?
Emily Channell-Justice
It’s a really good question. I have no poker face, so you probably can guess that I do not like the idea that self-organization is an indicator of a failed state. That’s a bad interpretation. If you talk to a single Ukrainian about it, nobody would put it that way. Self-organization can be a commentary on the state or a criticism of the state but it is also showing that people care enough and are willing enough to act on their citizenship, no matter what the state is doing. There is a belief that acting is the foundation of citizenship, which is what the state is supposed to be protecting. Don’t you think that a state is stronger if the people who live in it care about its existence? And not just that they want it to exist, but are willing to act in order to make sure that all the citizens who live in it have the same rights as everybody else. That’s the foundation of self-organization. If something needs to be done, and the state can not do it, but you are the person who can do it, then you do it. Yes, it does mean that the state capacity is not what it is supposed to be but it does not mean that the state is wrong or bad. Calling that a failed state is lazy. It just means that the way we think about the state does not typically include this type of activity, and we should change the way we think about the state.
What we see is more people doing more things that engage them differently with the state. Sometimes this is in the form of being proactive, when people create civil society organizations and make specific demands on the state, especially when they are experts and have the capacity to do so. However, there are other forms of self-organization: for example, volunteering to help displaced people. Of course, if the state does not have the capacity to help displaced people, it is not good. But I always end up asking “When was the last time you heard of an example of a state doing a phenomenally good job taking care of a surprised displacement?” Look at the United States during Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Thousands of people lost their homes. It was an absolute disaster but nobody would ever refer to the United States as a failed state. In this case, it means holding the Ukrainian state to some kind of standard that I do not think really exists.
We should not ignore that the people’s response actually tells us about the state and citizenship more than anything else. That is why self-organization as a response endures so well in Ukraine — because it can be in response to a government like the Yanukovych government, or in response to displaced people, or to the Ukrainian military not having the capacity to do what it needs to do. It is almost good that the state never took on those roles. It would have pushed out the civilian organizing that we have seen is so necessary. This absolutely fascinating process also tells us a lot about democracy. Ukraine has a different kind of democracy than other places in Europe. One kind is not inherently better than the other, but once Ukraine becomes a member of the EU, the EU is going to have to contend with this different type of democracy, one that is important for the European future.
Nadiia Chervinska
After this series of protests — the Revolution on Granite, the Orange Revolution, the Revolution of Dignity — we can trace not only the evolution of the revolutions in Ukraine but also reorganization of Ukrainian political society. After participating in the protests people learned that they have power that they can and, more importantly, they should use to achieve their goals. Sometimes this self-organization can be more fruitful than the existing political structures that make up a state. What do you think are the most significant lasting effects of self-organization during these protests in the context of political organization?
Emily Channell-Justice
Obviously, the commitment to a democratic political system is an absolutely essential influence of those protests. When somebody tries to implement an authoritarian government, you say “no, thank you” and kick him out of office. But it is also important on an individual level, to be able to look back at what you have done before and say “here is what worked and here is what did not.” I think the Russian impression of Ukraine was that it is a lot more fragmented than it actually is. And I really wonder how, 10 years after Euromaidan, that shared experience still makes people willing to fight against a much greater force like Russia. Having that shared experience of coming together — leftists, right wing people, and just average people — on one square with the same thing in mind. People know that they did that before and they can do it again. They know that they have fought for what they believe in before and it makes it a lot easier for people to fight now. I really think that the Euromaidan protests are essential to the condition of the current response to the full-scale invasion.
Nadiia Chervinska
I think that because the Revolution of Dignity involved violence and resulted in a lot of protesters’ death, this is also a motivation for a lot of people who are now volunteering or going to the army. They do not want all that happened during the revolution to be in vain.
Emily Channell-Justice
Exactly. I absolutely think so. People understand what others died for and what they were willing to risk their lives for and that is something that is not possible to measure. So-called objective political analysis is never going to understand what role that plays in motivating people. Even with people who were not actively or consistently participating in the revolution, I think this also resonated with them. At that time, it was not like the Russian armed forces themselves were coming in and killing protesters, but the role that Russia played in all of that is much clearer now. People remember what it felt like then, what it feels like now, and they are mad that it is happening again. Ukrainians show us that they know how to channel those emotions into doing something helpful. A lot of people in similar circumstances would shut down, while Ukrainians are just like “alright, we know what to do, and we are doing it.” It’s absolutely amazing.
Nadiia Chervinska
In your book, you mention that the reification of traditional gender roles within volunteer groups often hinders women from taking on decision-making roles, which can reinforce the stereotypes that women should not participate in political activities. Have you noticed any shift related to gender roles within the volunteer groups or Ukrainian army, especially after the full-scale invasion? How can it influence women’s political participation in Ukraine in the future?
Emily Channell-Justice
What I talk about the most is the reinforcement of stereotypes and pushing of women into private roles, not allowing them to take more active, public roles. We know that when the first invasion happened, women volunteered, even though they did not have any rights as combatants. The sheer commitment of gender-based activism to get women recognized as combatants and grant them the same protections as men is already a dramatic shift. It was activist groups that insisted on those rights and pushed for them to become legislation. That’s how a democracy works. Those types of examples show how far Ukraine came from 2014 to 2021. One of my favorite things that has been happening in response to the war is the ways Ukrainians are finding to articulate how Ukraine is different from Russia. For example, Russia imposing traditional values as part of their broad, orthodox mindset. The more women who volunteer and go into the armed forces, the more they are pushing back against the idea that women don’t have the right to fight for their country, and it has become an example of how Ukraine is different from Russia. It is not just that women could join the armed forces, it is that they do. You have this legislation that changes what women are legally allowed to be recognized as doing, and now women are actually doing it. I do not think it will go away when the war is won because those women will be veterans and they will have to be treated as veterans.
Unfortunately, as the war goes on, Ukrainian soldiers are dying, so the death toll will rise. There will be more women who take on roles that they did not previously take on. It is possible that we will see greater women’s representation in parliament, simply because there are more women who are healthy, educated, and able to take on those jobs. Although, I also think that a lot of men who ended up in the armed forces may turn their attention to politics too. Because they will feel like they have sacrificed and now they want to be a part of decision making.
What is masculinity going to look like in post war Ukraine? There is a lot of negotiation around gender, and there is a potential for gender norms to be totally reimagined. But there is also a tendency for people to want to return to the traditional status quo that they have given up in this context of war. This part of the question has to do with displacement and refugees. From all the data, it is mostly women and their children who have left the country. Are those women going to come back? They all say that they will, but in reality we never know. On the one hand, women who have left are potentially in a position to take on more responsibilities. On the other hand, women who have been responsible for becoming breadwinners in a foreign country may not be willing to do that anymore. It is really hard to know what the situation will look like in the future, as it depends a ton on different aspects.
Nadiia Chervinska
I would love to finish on a positive note. Again, I think your research is a really rare example of studying Ukraine and going to Ukraine, learning Ukrainian language, talking to Ukrainians, and trying to listen and understand them. I am saying this because I do not think that it is usually the case with a lot of other people studying Ukraine. Is there a chance that the situation in the academic field of Ukrainian studies will change?
Emily Channell-Justice
I am optimistic about it. I have a legacy of people like Paul Danieri and Catherine Wanner, who were Americans that wanted to study Ukraine, and who did it admirably. There were not many more people like them when I started, and they set a great example. I hope that me and others of my generation will also be an example of that. I am optimistic about the future of Ukrainian studies because Ukraine needs to be central in how we look at this part of the world. A lot of us have been having this conversation for a long time, and when people started listening to us, we were ready and we knew what to say — because we have already been saying this. I think we have really taken advantage of the fact that people are listening. I think people also understand that there are experts on Ukraine. They do not have to work with someone who studied Russia. I hope that people will get more interested and will continue to push that interest in Ukraine and not just let it fall back into interest in Russia. I genuinely believe that the field is going to change from now on. And obviously it is not just about Ukraine. We are also understanding what Soviet and Russian colonialism is and how it affects people in all parts of the former Russian and Soviet empires. It is not just about more people studying Ukraine, it is also about more people who are looking at that world through a different lens.