In this conversation at Visible Ukraine and Review of Democracy, Diana Dumitru—co-editor, with Dirk Moses, of the new collection The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Victims, Perpetrators, Justice, and the Question of Genocide—discusses the motives of various Russian perpetrators in Ukraine and how those motives might have evolved over time; shows how useful the concept of genocide proves when studying the multifaceted violence unleashed during Russia’s war of aggression; reflects on whether the current debates around genocide in Ukraine might reshape or expand our understanding of genocide and mass violence; and addresses the challenges in pursuing accountability for Russian crimes.
The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Victims, Perpetrators, Justice, and the Question of Genocide first appeared as a special issue of the Journal of Genocide Research. It has recently been republished by Routledge.
Ferenc Laczó
Next to the introduction you two have co-authored, the collection you have co-edited with Dirk Moses under the title The Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Victims, Perpetrators, Justice, and the Question of Genocide contains thirteen studies that were originally published in 2022 and 2023. They have just been republished as a book. What motivated you to prepare such an impressive collection for the Journal of Genocide Research? Which thematic priorities or special accents did you decide to set?
Diana Dumitru
We felt an urgent need to document what’s happening during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as well as analyze some of the complex issues around this aggression. We understood how difficult it is from a scholarly point of view to analyze a conflict that is ongoing, given a range of issues, including access to reliable information and data. Nevertheless, we felt that, despite these limitations, it was imperative to conduct research, so that we could shed light on and comprehend key aspects of the war.
As its title already suggests, ours is a journal for genocide research. To some extent, this pushed us to focus on genocide as one of the key issues of the conflict.
We wanted to cover the genocide and its extent in the midst of Russia’s war against Ukraine and also address the issue of accountability.
At the same time, we kept in mind that our journal is a multidisciplinary journal. Many different scholars—scholars of international relations, political scientists, historians, sociologists, and so on—read and publish in it. We tried to make sure that we have a variety of perspectives rooted in these different forms of scholarship in our effort to illuminate the war in Ukraine.
Nadiia Chervinska
Could I ask you about some of the most challenging editorial decisions you had to make? Were there perhaps any contributions or perspectives that you would have really wished to include but were unable to? If so, why not?
Diana Dumitru
The biggest challenge was how to balance the breadth of this collection with its depth. The horizontal dimension was defined by the type of issues; the vertical, the case studies and analyses of specific actions on the ground. Emphasizing one over the other risked producing an incoherent account, which is a particular danger when you’re putting together a special collection like this. We tried to cover different aspects, but at the same time did not want to make it disjointed.
It probably would have been helpful, for example, to have different comparative analyses with other conflicts. However, we aimed to keep our focus on the genocide debate and its legal complexities in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and illustrate relevant aspects of those, while avoiding the unnecessary dispersion of our efforts or following numerous leads which would have taken us into other important but maybe less related debates. Deciding what exactly to include and what not to include was indeed the most difficult.
Nadiia Chervinska
A multilayered discussion has unfolded about the concept of genocide and its applicability to Russia’s war of aggression and its various facets. Scholars share numerous critical remarks on the uses and abuses of the concept on these pages. At the same time, several contributors, including Yulia Ioffe, Alexander Etkind, and Martin Shaw, clearly plead for its applicability to crimes Russian actors have committed since February 2022. To which dimensions of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine can the concept be rightly applied, and why? More generally, how useful is the concept of genocide when aiming to study this multifaceted violence in as encompassing a fashion as possible?
Diana Dumitru
We do not pretend that we’re going to find a definitive response to as highly debated an issue as genocide in general and the applicability of this concept to so many conflicts throughout history until today in various regions of the globe.
We do understand, however, just how politicized, how debated, how used and abused the term genocide is. With this understanding in mind, we tried to see what the scholarship looks like right now, and what kind of objective data could be marshaled to have a scholarly discussion.
After all, we are an academic platform. We are not a political platform, nor are we writing policy. We’re trying to understand phenomena.
Out of these kinds of efforts to understand how you can justify [the use of the term genocide] or talk about genocide in the context of the war in Ukraine several dimensions were brought up. These were real possibilities of applying the concept. One example was the forced transfer of Ukrainian children. As we know, in fact, the International Criminal Court officially recognized this as a case of genocide. Scholars have also talked about the systematic targeting of Ukrainian culture as genocide, especially with the intent to destroy Ukrainians as a national group. In her article on sexual violence during the war, Kateryna Busol also shows how there is an intent to erase the identity of Ukrainians and superimpose a Russian identity through sexual violence and reproduction.
Martin Shaw argues that we should widen the lens of genocide and include more than we currently do. He makes the case that Ukraine’s society, its social fabric or social ties are being destroyed. In his argument, the destruction of the structure of a society equals a genocidal war if not outright genocide.
In sum, this volume points toward specific areas where one can apply the framework of genocide, but also proposes a widening of it as a legal as well as a moral concept.
Ferenc Laczó
Proving genocide is, of course, connected to demonstrating intent and thus requires a close study of perpetrators. Several articles in this collection indeed explore Russian perpetrators, including Kateryna Busol, Martin Shaw—whom you have just mentioned—and Franziska Exeler. What can we say about the motives of various Russian perpetrators and how might those motives have evolved over time?
Diana Dumitru
The issue of intent is probably the biggest stumbling block for demonstrating that genocide has taken place. The double challenge is not only to document the behavior of certain people on the ground, like soldiers, but also that there are, at the state level, orders demanding this kind of behavior as well as explicit, intentional rhetoric. These are complex issues that demand evidence.
On-the-ground statements of soldiers have been included and analyzed in the articles in our volume. But one also needs to additionally substantiate and prove intent with statements coming from state officials and from mass media—for instance, in the case of Bucha authors are documenting these. But as some of our articles argue, in many cases it’s extremely difficult even for Ukrainian scholars to have this kind of rock-solid evidence, just as it is difficult in all other cases too where genocide was committed or is claimed to have been committed.
If we only talk about the motivations of soldiers on the ground, the case studies demonstrate that two things are happening. Predictably, soldiers act on a mix of motives, including state propaganda, nationalistic discourse or nationalistically-minded sentiments, a sense of duty, as well as fear of being punished if one refuses to obey orders.
An important additional point is that motivations may change and have in fact changed: Russian soldiers have become more aggravated and felt embattled as the war continues.
They start losing their fellow soldiers and friends in the war. They become desensitized to violence. These soldiers have also shown that they want to assert dominance over Ukrainian civilians. They choose violence as a reaction. We clearly see what has happened: they have become radicalized and increasingly brutal over the course of the conflict.
Interestingly, Kateryna Busol points to other types of motivations that take us to the realm of culture. For example, she argues that toxic masculinity is a key part of the culture in Russia, and that imperial ideology is prevalent: a positive view of Russian imperialism is shared among wide segments of Russian society. This likewise shapes in special and negative ways the violence that soldiers commit against Ukrainian civilians and captive Ukrainian soldiers. These sets of motivations work in tandem to inflict damage on Ukraine and its people.
Nadiia Chervinska
Given the historical evolution of the genocide concept, do you see the current debates around genocide in Ukraine as potentially reshaping or expanding our understanding of genocide and mass violence in academic as well as legal contexts? Would you say that there are emerging concepts or frameworks that you believe will become more prominent in future scholarship? And could such reconsiderations lead to a broader interpretation of what constitutes genocide?
Diana Dumitru
This war again and again challenges us to discuss and rethink issues of intent as well as the scale of violence: what is intent, and do there have to be a large number of victims to constitute a genocide? People outside of academia often work with the assumption that genocide has to have the scale of the Holocaust: there has to be a huge number of victims and a very clear agenda behind the violence. The case of Ukraine forces us to acknowledge that the concept of genocide cannot be pinned down to numbers nor the intent to eliminate people. Such issues definitely add to the discussion.
The issue of cultural genocide, which is a recurring topic in this war, is not so easily equated with the intent to erase the people of Ukraine in their entirety. The problem is rather about forcibly changing identity and cultural erasure.
The concept of genocidal war may become much more prominent in the future precisely because of what we are observing in Ukraine today. These issues will push us to expand our understanding of genocide, under which we may probably have to understand a wider range of destructive acts. Put simply, we will also have to look at those acts that try to eradicate a group’s cultural and social foundations in addition to the prominent and widely accepted issue of physical elimination, as the latter remains so important to the issue of genocide.
Nadiia Chervinska
The contributions by Yulia Ioffe, Kateryna Busol, and Kevin Jon Heller raise significant legal questions. Given the complexities and also the often rather slow pace of international justice, what do you see as the immediate and more long-term challenges in pursuing accountability for Russian war crimes? What do you believe are the most urgent reforms needed in international law to address these inadequacies?
Diana Dumitru
The news is not very good. As we’ve been working on this topic with legal scholars who have the best expertise on the topic, we’ve come to the realization that the process to punish actors is very cumbersome, complex, and the toolkit which exists to hold them responsible for their actions is not at all perfect. There’s no question that holding actors responsible requires an international effort. Top-level states need to put aside their own narrow political interests and agendas and should rather turn toward thinking through and building a legal framework which is constant, permanent, widely accepted, and has credibility in the eyes of the international community.
Regarding the immediate steps to be taken: first of all, sufficient evidence must be gathered. This should be done as soon as possible. One quickly loses access to or the very existence of evidence that could be used in trials. Then there’s the issue of guaranteeing witness protection. Experts in the field, those who are knowledgeable about the legal issues related to proving genocide, all agree that witnesses must be protected.
The question of navigating this complex international legal framework also arises. It appears to be a conundrum, but in the long term it would be important to maintain international pressure and not to forget or move on when others’ agendas start to take over. Out of this, guarantees would need to be secured so that states cooperate on all of these issues.
In terms of the reforms which would need to be made, Kevin Jon Heller’s article is an excellent point of departure. We need to improve the ways that international courts function. Right now, international courts do not have real enforcement mechanism. As we all know, Putin travels despite the warrant for his arrest—and what can the ICC do about that? It’s up to states to decide whether or not to take steps.
To have rulings but not have an enforcement mechanism is to be a paper tiger.
Additionally, new kinds of legal frameworks could also cover new issues that we haven’t thought of including before, such as cyber warfare or disinformation campaigns. All of this requires new ways of thinking in a more comprehensive manner about what could potentially be punished. But there are no easy answers, not even among specialists. Heller, for example, brings up the issue of the personal immunity of high-ranking leaders. He’s talking specifically about Putin and Lavrov, but more generally he observes that no national or international court would be able work around such immunities. This is an issue in large part because of the way that existent legislation is framed. It seems to me that this is a very big stumbling block that should somehow be removed.
Heller likewise points to the issue of selectivity problems when deciding if, when, and what kind of trial there will be. He explains that of the array of options that are available, each one of them is quite difficult to achieve because the legal structure is shaky. Perhaps the best we could do is an ad hoc tribunal. But immediately a number of critical voices would ask: Why now? Why not have a similar tribunal for the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003? Heller points here to the issue of selectivity and the legitimacy problem it would bring into the international arena.
The conclusion is that we ought to construct a tribunal which is endorsed by Ukraine along with the United Nations and supported by the UN General Assembly; this would be the best kind of tribunal to have.
Kateryna Busol also enters this discussion, but from a different angle. She points to the fact that conflict-related sexual violence is definitely underreported and stigmatized, and so a whole different type of issue appears which requires a different set of tools to solve. Busol argues that we need to build more robust legal mechanisms for prosecuting these kinds of crimes. At the same time, we would also need teams of investigators and prosecutors to be trained for the particular task of investigating wartime sexual violence. It remains a question who would have this specific knowledge and who would know how to work in this field.
Such thorny issues are raised and addressed by the contributors to our volume.
Ferenc Laczó
Another theme that comes up recurrently in this collection is how Ukrainians have shaped their own destiny, just as their agency has often been severely underestimated, not least in the Western study of international relations. Maria Mälksoo underlines this issue particularly compellingly, I thought. A major related discussion has concerned the possibilities of decolonizing perspectives on Eastern Europe, and here Mälksoo points to notable recent achievements. One might also want to analyze, more generally, how discussions of Ukraine and mass violence in Ukraine fit into broader trends and what might make them rather specific. Do you believe that this war marks a shift in how these regions are perceived and studied within the broader field of international relations and postcolonial studies? How do you relate to the possibilities of broader, more global contextualization?
Diana Dumitru
Maria Mälksoo argues that the war has marked a post-colonial moment for Eastern Europe. Working from the assumptions of international relations theory, she states that, before the war, there was a peculiarly Europe-centric position which in fact frequently ignored the post-socialist states of Eastern Europe and viewed them more as passive objects rather than active subjects in global politics. Mälksoo’s opinion is that this is changing.
The EU has to reconsider viewing Eastern Europe in this way. It has to step back and see the countries of Eastern Europe as active entities reasserting their sovereignty and their political agency in the face of Russian imperialism.
We see on the ground that the closer these European states are to the border of Russia, the harder the line they take toward Russia. The issue of these states’ security is paramount. It’s not theory, it’s not a discussion about colonialism or post-colonialism; it is about security. This is leading to a re-evaluation of the region in general. Just to note, this discussion is not only happening in international relations. One also sees this in history—which is the field I am trained in. There’s no doubt that we will see more attention given to the countries of the region which was not there before.
Understandably, interest in Ukraine currently takes first place. But slowly other countries in Eastern Europe are also garnering attention. To give an illustrative anecdote, some North American university research centers focusing on Eastern Europe used to be called some variation of Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies, but after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine they removed the word Russian from their name—take the example of the renamed Centre for European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto. That doesn’t mean that Russia will disappear from the focus of scholarship, especially since Russia is such a threat not only to Eastern Europe, but also to the entire global community. But I think such changes convey the message that the scholarly community is going to pay attention to other players in the region on their own terms, not only as appendages of Russia or only as the entangled objects of Russia’s agendas or policies.
This is happening on multiple fronts in scholarship. Still, if we take a step back and look at the bigger picture, Russia’s war against Ukraine has caused a massive shift in international relations, showing just how interconnected global powers are. Look at the sanctions against Russia: there are all of these questions about what they can or cannot do, how their intended designs can be avoided or have unintended consequences.
In a sense, we have to reassess everything we understood before about international economic relationships and how they function: Is economic integration still a deterrent to aggression?
This was assumed for quite a long time, and maybe in some quarters this assumption still exists. But the war in Ukraine has shown us that this may not be true. We all know just how tightly integrated the EU and Russia were, particularly in terms of oil and gas production and consumption, and there was a strong assumption, probably even from the Russian side, about how difficult it will be to disentangle the two.
The war has taught us that we will now have to reconsider many of our assumptions about international relations, including the deference given to big powers on issues of security, the national interest, and especially cybersecurity and scientific collaboration. In the United States, where I’m based, there is a lot of attention given to China in the news, particularly the fear that scientific and technological collaboration with China may give them a doorway to undermine American national or global security.
Said earnestly, there are new fears regarding international cooperation. This takes on a new meaning in an era when war has other dimensions beyond on-the-ground military activities. Suddenly the external dimensions of states, their international relations take on much greater prominence.
This transcript was edited for length and clarity in cooperation with Cody Inglis. Lilit Hakobyan edited the audio recording.