On May 29, during a joint press conference with Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels, Péter Magyar stated that “we have already informed the Hungarian press that expert-level negotiations are ongoing between the Ukrainian and Hungarian sides. What matters most to us is to obtain guarantees that the approximately 100,000 Hungarian citizens residing in Ukraine will, after 10–15 years, once again be able to use their mother tongue in education, cultural life, and public administration. We have an 11-point proposal, which is not new to the Ukrainian side; it primarily concerns educational, cultural, and language rights, and we expect the Ukrainian side to fulfil these commitments in full.”
On June 2 in Berlin, at a joint press conference with Chancellor Friedrich Merz, he elaborated further. Rather than stating that Hungarians in Transcarpathia would be able to use their mother tongue again after 10–15 years, he emphasized that “a country seeking to initiate accession negotiations with the European Union must comply with these rights, and I am very optimistic that this dispute, which has persisted for more than a decade, can be resolved with Ukraine.”
Finally, on June 3, speaking from Paris on the eve of the Day of National Unity, “a few kilometres from the Trianon Palace,” he announced that “we have achieved a breakthrough with our Ukrainian negotiating partners regarding the language use, educational, and cultural rights of our compatriots in Transcarpathia.”
Before moving on, it is worth examining what this statement actually entails in substantive terms. I initially interpreted the reference to “Hungarian citizens” as a slip of the tongue. While it is true that Hungarians in Transcarpathia are, in many cases, also Hungarian citizens, the issue at stake is not the protection of the rights of Hungarian citizens on the territory of Ukraine. Agreements of this kind do not regulate the legal status of another state’s citizens; rather, they address the rights of national minorities who are citizens of Ukraine and reside within its territory, irrespective of whether they may also hold a second citizenship. The subsequent use of the term “compatriots” suggested that this was not, in fact, a slip of the tongue.
The 2017 Framework Law on Education
The Ukrainian Law on Education, adopted in 2017, forms part of a longer-term education policy trajectory, which had already established the primacy of Ukrainian as the state language since the adoption of the 2002 National Doctrine on Education Development. The law was adopted on September 5, 2017 in a highly politicised environment, shortly after the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force. The legislation introduced a comprehensive reform of the educational system; however, controversy emerged primarily around Article 7, which stipulates that the language of the educational process is the state language. Compared to the previous regulatory framework, the law narrowed minority rights: while it guaranteed the use of minority languages in pre-school and primary education, it prescribed a gradual transition to bilingual schooling/teaching/instruction (minority language alongside the state language) at the secondary level.
The international assessment of the law highlighted the problematic nature of these changes. Both the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission acknowledged the state’s legitimate aim of strengthening the role of the state language; at the same time, they emphasised that the regulation fails to strike an appropriate balance between the state and minority languages and leads to a disproportionate reduction in the use of the minority languages in secondary education. The core of the criticism, therefore, did not concern the strengthening of the state language as such, but rather the fact that the law narrowed the effective operating conditions of previously existing minority education models.
The regulatory framework was subsequently amended. From the perspective of national minorities, the key element of this modification was that the revised wording of Article 7 explicitly stipulates that, in the case of minorities speaking official languages of the European Union, the use of the given minority language in the educational process is guaranteed. This constitutes an important legal-technical development, as the minority language may appear not just as a school subject, but also as a language of instruction in its own right.
It is important to emphasise that these legislative changes were primarily introduced at the normative level and did not result in the immediate dismantling or radical transformation of the minority education institutional system. In practice, the Hungarian (and of other minorities) school networks have largely remained intact.
The 2019 State Language Law
In some countries, including Ukraine, the use of the state language is regulated by a dedicated law. The Law on Ensuring the Functioning of Ukrainian as the State Language, adopted in 2019, represents the culmination of a broader political and legal process that included the constitutional controversy surrounding the 2012 language law and its annulment by the Constitutional Court in 2018. The already existing push for establishing the primacy of Ukrainian as a state language was further reinforced due to the state-building and security considerations after 2014.
The adoption of the new law took place on April 25, 2019, immediately after the second round of the presidential elections, during a period of political transition. The parliamentary debate took a highly symbolic turn, as the supporters of the outgoing president interpreted the law as an instrument to restore the national identity and historical justice. The participation of MPs representing the national minorities was fragmented: some supported the legislation, others voted against it, while several abstained from the vote.
In substantive terms, the law is clearly designed to strengthen the dominant role of the Ukrainian language. It is not a general law regulating linguistic pluralism, but rather one that mandates the use of the state language across nearly all spheres of public life, including public administration, local government operations, education, the media, the cultural sector, and public services. Although private life and religious practice fall outside the direct scope of the regulation, the law clearly structures the linguistic regime of the public sphere around the primacy of the Ukrainian language. In doing so, the legislation institutionalises a language policy direction that had previously been derived partly from Constitutional Court jurisprudence and partly from a fragmented regulatory framework.
The Venice Commission’s assessment acknowledged that strengthening the state language constitutes a legitimate aim of the state while emphasizing the necessity of maintaining an appropriate balance between the state language and the linguistic rights of national minorities. The Commission underlined that legislation must not result in disproportionate restrictions and highlighted, in particular, the importance of ensuring the effective practical implementation of minority language rights. In its subsequent interpretative practice, the Commission also took into account the 2021 decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, according to which more favourable treatment of minority languages belonging to the category of official languages of the European Union does not constitute discrimination.
Overall, the 2019 Language Law established a centralised state language governance regime, which institutionalized the dominant role of the Ukrainian language in public life. At the same time, subsequent legislative amendments contributed to the gradual emergence of a more complex regulatory environment, in which protection of the state language and safeguarding of minority language rights operate in parallel, albeit in an asymmetrical relationship. The period between 2019 and 2025 thus did not lead to the dismantling of minority institutions, but rather to the legal reframing of linguistic rights and their gradual alignment with European standards.
The Szijjártó “11-Point” Proposal
At the beginning of 2024, negotiations commenced between the two countries on the so-called “11-point proposal” submitted to the Ukrainian side by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Péter Szijjártó. The negotiations were conducted without public access, and even the content of the “11 points” became known only through investigative journalism. Despite this, the document has become one of the key structuring elements of the minority policy dimension of Hungarian–Ukrainian bilateral relations.
A central element of the “11 points” concerned the modification of the linguistic structure of the education system. The proposals aimed to strengthen institutional guarantees for Hungarian-language education, with particular emphasis on expanding the decision-making powers of school principals regarding the language of instruction, ensuring the full use of the Hungarian language throughout the educational process, and restoring the legal status of Hungarian-language educational institutions. The package would also have allowed greater flexibility in the choice of the language of instruction in the institutions of higher education and vocational training, including private institutions.
The document further placed significant emphasis on adapting the unified state examination system to minority languages. In this context, the possibility was raised of making secondary school leaving examinations and multi-subject university entrance examinations available in Hungarian (with the exception of the Ukrainian language and foreign languages), in order to provide equal educational opportunities for minority students.
A further structural element of the “11 points” concerned the redefinition of linguistic rights on territorial and demographic grounds. The proposal suggested determining the entitlements to the use of Hungarian at the level of individual settlements, as opposed to an approach based on larger administrative units. In addition, it did not seek to tie the exercise of minority rights exclusively to fixed percentage-based population thresholds; however, in certain interpretations, 10–15% demographic thresholds also appeared as possible reference points for defining a “significant presence”. In terms of territorial scope, the proposals were not limited to the narrower residential areas of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia, but instead implied a broader regional framework encompassing the entire Transcarpathian region. This represented a notable departure from the existing Ukrainian legal approach, particularly in the interpretation of linguistic rights and cultural autonomy.
Certain elements of the document were also aimed at strengthening cultural autonomy, including the free use of national symbols and holidays, as well as institutional guarantees for community-based cultural self-organisation.
Further elements of the “11-points” addressed questions of political participation and representation, including the free use of minority languages in political life and electoral processes, as well as the relaxation of language proficiency requirements as a condition for public participation (for example, whether a mayor is required to know the state language). The proposal also raised the issue of guaranteed parliamentary representation for minorities, which requires political and institutional rearrangement of the existing Ukrainian legal framework.
Partial implementation of the “11-points” had already taken place prior to its formal submission. However, this was not taken into account during the negotiations. Moreover, from the Hungarian side, the introduction of additional and ever-expanding demands beyond the original “11 points” during the negotiation process suggested a divergence in negotiating objectives and expectations, and indicated an attempt to establish a reference framework for blocking Ukraine’s EU accession aspirations, after which the consultations were terminated before Hungary’s assumption of the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in July 2025.
The “11-Points” Revisited
In May 2025, the issue of minority rights in Hungarian–Ukrainian relations once again returned to the level of formal diplomatic consultations. The Hungarian government announced the launch of structured negotiations with Ukraine on the regulation of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia, with the substantive starting point of these discussions being the previously formulated so-called “11-point” package of demands. In this way, the issue was re-institutionalised within a formal negotiation framework, which both parties explicitly linked to European integration processes and the EU accession conditionality framework.
The negotiations remained non-public. Following three rounds of “technical consultations”, Prime Minister Péter Magyar reported from Paris on the outcomes. In his statement, he emphasised that significant progress had been achieved in a short period compared to the previous governmental cycle with regard to the regulation of minority rights, particularly in the areas of education, language use, and cultural rights. He stressed that, according to the Hungarian government’s position, Ukraine’s EU accession process is conditional upon the institutional guarantee of extensive linguistic, educational, cultural, and political rights for the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia, and that these rights must also be reflected in EU assessment and monitoring mechanisms.
According to the statement, the Ukrainian side made comprehensive commitments regarding the strengthening of the system of minority-language schools, the broader use of the Hungarian language in education and public life, and the safeguarding of the free practice of cultural identity. Under the terms of the understanding, the Hungarian side indicated that it would support the opening of EU accession negotiations, provided that the implementation of these commitments is ensured in a verifiable manner.
From the rhetorical structure of the statement, however, it can be inferred that the Prime Minister is not merely listing the concrete outcomes of the concluded consultations, but rather presenting existing legal frameworks and jointly agreed principles from the negotiations as a unified package of results. This framing may create the impression that certain rights have been newly established or substantially expanded, whereas in practice some of these rights had already existed.
By way of example, the reference to the “free use of the Hungarian language at academic conferences”, which at first glance appears to constitute a new guarantee. In reality, however, this practice has already been present in numerous institutions. At the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian University in Berehove (formerly the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian College of Higher Education), which has provided Hungarian-language instruction since its establishment, this is part of the normal operational framework. Moreover, even at the Uzhhorod National University, a Ukrainian-language institution, Hungarian-language presentations are regularly given at conferences, a fact also reflected in programme descriptions specifying the “language of the conference”.
It is also sufficient to consult the local Hungarian-language press and the websites of Hungarian institutions. This includes the fact that the institution in Berehove, which until recently operated as a college and has held university status since the previous year, along with its associated research centres, also demonstrates at the level of everyday practice the institutional presence of language use, as well as the ongoing possibility of establishing and developing Hungarian institutions.
Beyond the statement by Péter Magyar, no further concrete details of the agreement are available—although it was explicitly endorsed by representatives of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia. However, given the content of the “11-points” proposal, a plausible reconstruction can nevertheless be made.
The agreement could not be understood as introducing concrete legislative amendments at this stage, but rather as a set of commitments regarding the subsequent statutory codification of the understandings reached. Given the limited timeframe, a more far-reaching legal redesign would not appear feasible; instead, the emphasis is placed on guarantees concerning the future incorporation of the agreed principles into domestic legislation.
A new element may be the emergence of a more detailed and expanded minority rights framework, introducing stronger institutional and territorial guarantees than those previously in place. The central role of the state language within the education system is unlikely to change; however, stricter conditions may be introduced regarding the transformation or closure of educational institutions in response to demographic change and evolving demand. The framework may also codify a return to the designation of “national minority schools”, distinct from the concept of “Ukrainian school” on the institutional level. Furthermore, it may formally define the concept of a “traditionally nationally minority-inhabited administrative-territorial unit”, potentially incorporating criteria of long-term demographic continuity and thresholds in the range of 10–15%.
While the state language would remain the mandatory foundational language, minority languages could acquire the status of “co-official languages in certain contexts” in a range of local and public service contexts. This would be particularly relevant at the level of local self-government, administrative procedures, public information, electoral communication, and certain public events.
In the field of cultural identity, the agreement would explicitly enshrine the right to use minority symbols, establish cultural institutions, and freely practice traditions and commemorative observances. At the same time, the primacy of state symbols would remain in force, alongside certain limitations, including restrictions on totalitarian symbols.
Regarding the parliamentary representation, such enforceable individual minority rights have not previously been guaranteed in this form— this is not a category of legal entitlement that can simply be “restored”. Moreover, given that it would require a constitutional amendment, it is not feasible under wartime conditions, even if there were political will. At the same time, it is already possible to consider what kind of institutional model could be established in this area. This is a policy issue that Ukraine should assess in cooperation with international organisations (the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities), on the basis of relevant European best practices.
The essence of such a model, given that minorities— excluding the Russian-speaking minority—represent very small proportions of the population, would necessarily rely on forms of positive action measures for minorities, such as quotas, special electoral lists, reserved seats, or other comparable mechanisms. In other words, this would primarily constitute a technical extension of legal rights, to be introduced gradually and, in part, subject to further international consultations.
According to Péter Magyar, “Ukraine must align its action plan with the outcomes of the Hungarian–Ukrainian negotiations, and within the framework of the accession process, the European Union will continuously monitor the implementation of this action plan. In light of the comprehensive agreement, the Hungarian government calls on Ukraine to amend its minority action plan in line with the agreed terms. If this is done, the Hungarian government will support the opening of the first accession negotiating cluster by the European Union. This is how we can ensure that, within the enlargement process, Ukraine fully implements all commitments it has made regarding the rights of the Hungarian minority.”
However, it is questionable why the Prime Minister framed Ukraine’s ability to fulfil its commitments in terms of a “10 or 15-year-long” horizon. In any case, it has not been meaningful to attach fixed timeframes to EU accession negotiations in the case of any candidate country to date.
Concluding Remarks
The Hungarian community, by its own decision, joined the administrative reform process at a later stage, which resulted in a less favourable position during the 2015–2020 territorial reorganisation. This reform transformed a previously highly fragmented settlement structure into larger local government units with expanded municipal competences. While in the case of other minority groups—for example, Romanians in Transcarpathia—this process led to greater territorial and institutional concentration, the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia remained embedded in a more fragmented settlement structure, resulting in weaker capacities for interest representation and institutional maintenance.
In parallel, certain other minority groups—such as the Romanian community—benefited from strengthened municipal structures that, due to the breadth of local administrative and decision-making powers, in practice approximated more robust forms of local self-government. By contrast, such a level of institutional concentration has been less evident in the case of the Hungarian community.
Demographic trends have also moved in an unfavourable direction: due to the dispersed settlement pattern and ongoing emigration, the long-term population-retention capacity of the community appears to be weakening, with increasingly limited prospects for a structural reversal of this trend. In this context, the role of Roma communities identifying as Hungarian is comparatively underrepresented in public discourse, despite the fact that they have long been an important factor in the functioning and sustainability of Hungarian-language educational institutions.