The year 2024 was meant to be the year of democracy. In the largest election year in the history of the world, nearly half of humanity, some three and a half billion people, were able to cast votes in 72 countries. As the year progressed, commentators pointed out that an unusually high proportion of incumbents were removed from office and that voters tended to shift to the right in numerous countries.
The debate now centers on whether 2024 was good or bad for democracy. In terms of the long-term effects of the 2024 elections on democracy, much will obviously depend on how the winners will fare in office. In “Democracy After 2024,” the new series at the Review of Democracy, leading experts offer insights into 2024 as a seminal year for global democracy and its significance for the years ahead, examining trends we should fear and showing where hope lies for a more democratic future.
Sasha Kokhan
Welcome everyone. My name is Oleksandra Kohan. I am a Central European University (CEU) student in social anthropology.
Sergiy Kudelia
My name is Sergiy Kudela. I am an Associate Professor of Political Science at Baylor University, and I have been studying Ukraine for about 20 years now. That was what I wrote my dissertation on, and most of my studies and articles dealt with Ukrainian politics.
Taras Fedirko
My name is Taras Fedirko. I am a political economist and an economic anthropologist at the University of Glasgow, and I study the political economy of media, war, and oligarchy in Ukraine. I am from Ukraine, and I have done extensive fieldwork in Ukraine, and this is something that I have been dealing with for a while.
Sasha Kokhan
Today, we are going to talk about the change in domestic politics in Ukraine and its relation to martial law. As we now see, Ukraine has been going through significant transformations. The outcome of some of them is not clear, so I would like you to tell me your personal stance on the question of whether the full-scale invasion changed the character of domestic politics in Ukraine, and if so, in which spheres?
Sergiy Kudelia
The martial law is a particular legal framework that restricts certain types of political activities and in some ways limits the functioning of political institutions. The most obvious impact that martial law has is the fact that we do not have elections on time anymore.
I think when we talk about the impact of the war, we have to think a little broader than just a particular legal framework. Prior to 2014, which I think is the first important date that we have to consider, Ukraine had a very liberal legal framework.
It was very easy to form political parties and we had a lot of them in Ukraine. As a result, political competition in Ukraine was very intense. The entry for new political parties was very easy, so there was a lot of turnover of new political parties in the parliament as well. Of course, in 2014, that changed.
Once you have the annexation of Crimea, once you have the beginning of the armed conflict in Donbas with Russian participation, certain types of political parties and activities become more illegal. One of the most obvious ones was the Communist Party, whose members participated in insurgency campaigns, organized separatists, and supported separatist movements in Donbas and other parts of Ukraine, so the party had to pay a political price.
This was the first instance where you had a clear attempt to restrict political space in the interest of the state, in the national interest. But even then, under the conditions of a proxy war with Russia that continued until 2022, we had several strong, large political parties that were openly supporting relations with Russia and whose leaders visited Moscow. Yurii Boyko or Viktor Medvedchuk went to Moscow and met with the key Russian government officials, and that was permissible. The fact that you had these types of political parties that were openly affiliated with foreign powers also shows the extent to which pluralism in Ukraine survived despite the beginning of the proxy war.
It was also a demonstration or reflection of particular societal preferences that existed in Ukraine at the time. Despite the fact that you have an outbreak of the proxy war, you still have a chunk of the population, I would say about 20 percent, who were willing to vote for politicians who openly advocated for closer relations with Russia.
Fast forward to 2022, you see further restrictions in the political space that obviously affect those pro-Russian political parties that I just mentioned. It is understandable why it was happening: many of these political parties were basically functioning as proxy representatives of the Russian state and in some ways acted as subversive actors within Ukraine. Once you have the beginning of a full-scale war, you have to target those actors that you feel are not acting in good faith, that are willing or interested in destroying the very state that they are a part of. In that sense, one of the first direct impacts or influences of the war is the restriction or shrinking of the political space.
You also have a set of restrictions set on the functioning of institutions. I would say that the centralization of political power that happens in Ukraine, in some ways, goes against the constitution of Ukraine. The constitution presumes that you have a clear division of power between the prime minister and the president, and the prime minister is responsible primarily to the parliament and the government is formed by the parliament.
The linkage is unfortunately broken, and it had been broken even prior to the invasion. It has become even more visible now when the presidential office acts as a de facto government in Ukraine, and the president of Ukraine acts both as the president and as prime minister, or his chief of staff sometimes acts as a shadow prime minister. In that sense, you also have these negative consequences for democracy in Ukraine, because the core provisions of the constitution are also violated consistently.
I would say these are some of the important influences, but I will be interested to hear what the rest is.
Taras Fedirko
I think that sets the hard parameters for political competition. Under martial law, elections are suspended and I think that removes a core test of strength, if you will, from out of the political system.
The Ukrainian political system has often been characterized as a patronal one, right? It means that the political struggles are between patron-client groups over control of resources and the exercise of powers closely linked to the disbursement of rewards and punishments by people leading these groups.
These groups articulate with one another into these longer hierarchical chains of patron-client relations. In such systems, elections are important because they signal potential popular support for patrons in chief or for important figures. In a situation when there is no prospect of elections because that directly depends on what is going to happen on the battlefield and whether Ukraine survives and whether Ukraine wins, when, and how, these patrons had to signal their strength to their supporters in new ways. This is also closely connected to the fact that the core political issue of the day-to-day is the conduct of the war and the conduct of Ukraine in the war. That is an issue that no one but the government or the de facto government in the office of the president and the military that have come under political control up to a point have any say over.
They are the only ones who are seen as responsible for it. Recent polls show that more than three quarters of Ukrainians see the president of Ukraine as the main responsible figure for Ukraine’s victories and losses and the conduct of war while trusting him a lot less than they trust the military.
There is a sort of vesting of core expectations in the executive that creates a problem for people in the extended presidential network, who are not the main patron-in-chief, but who are sort of sub-patrons. It creates problems for figures in the parliament, especially the opposition, who in order to be seen as relevant by potential voters or by their clients have to embrace a severely restricted range of options. They cannot pursue a kind of a distinctive line of policy at the risk of being seen as someone who rocks the boat, who undermines Ukraine’s capacity for self-defense, et cetera, et cetera. There is not just a shrinking of the range of political forces, but a shrinking of the ways of operating these forces. One interesting thing that I have been observing is that at the regional level or the city level administrations and leaders of administrations, embrace a new demotic political language of, for example, crowdfunding and direct support to the military, which had been elaborated by the so-called volunteers and sort of the spontaneous volunteer supporters of the Ukrainian military.
But even on the international level, as a way of signaling to their supporters and direct allies that they are involved in the core political issue of the day. Likewise, they compete against incumbents or, if they are in opposition or against others within the system on the ground of proposing better solutions for military problems or for problems of military-related governance. All of that, I think, creates a sense of cohesion around the core problem of the day. That, I think, puts a stress on being seen as governing in the public interest, which then comes with a new shape of political conflicts.
Sasha Kokhan
I just noted that the main problem seems to be the centralization of the power within which the modes in which actors can operate are also diminished. If I am getting everything, this leads me to the thought about civil society and government that nowadays relation between what is a civil society and what is a governmental body seems to be changing. I wanted to ask whether you noticed this change. If so, what is the line of tension between what is civil and what is governmental and how does it work?
Sergiy Kudelia
In the absence of elections, in the absence of the parliament as an effective instrument of control over the government or over the president’s role in civil society, I think, is particularly important in Ukraine. Initially, in the first year of the war, I would say that civil society was more targeting specific social issues of support or assistance for the war effort. Now, especially over the last year, civil society returned, many of the civil society groups, and organizations, including the media, journalists, anti corruption activists, returned to some of the pre-war functions, that they played as far as investigating the government and exposing some of the corruption that exists within the government, or exposing other types of abuses, not just within the government, but even within the military. I think that was, for me personally, the most impressive part, because you would imagine that a country that is targeted to such an extent by its neighbor has certain issues that cannot be touched or discussed. In fact, what we have seen is that there has been a lot of coverage of corruption within the military. Very recent articles in the Ukrainian press discuss the abuses that are committed by top generals against regular soldiers in the army. In that sense, civil society, media, and journalists play extremely important roles as far as protecting the interests of many of the rank and file soldiers who are basically ignored within the existing power structures in Ukraine.
Of course, there is also a lot of pressure on Zelensky, specifically, the office of the president from anti-corruption activists. This is visible during press conferences where questions are being asked about this or that particular official, or through the reports that civil society activists provide on the activities of certain individuals. I would say civil society in Ukraine remains robust despite the war, and that gives me a lot of optimism about the future. I would say that civil society also becomes or has become the most important accountability instrument within Ukraine that allows society to somehow provide some kind of feedback to the government about what exactly it thinks. Taras talked about the level of trust in Zelensky that has been dropping. With this dropping in trust, it is particularly important that these feedback mechanisms are there so that the government understands the reasons why you have this drop in the trust for top officials in the country.
Taras Fedirko
In general, I agree, but I think that it is important to recognize that when we are talking about the anti-corruption activists and others, we talk about “professional civil society.” Organizations and individuals who have been at it for a long time and whose main paid activity is holding the government to account. They indeed have been becoming more active and assuming their pre-invasion roles. That is salutary, and we see the results of that. At the same time, we see very few actors who would, for example, openly seek to channel the growing discontent with the conduct of the war and with the goals of the war, and who would openly question the goals of the war and the stance of the government vis-a-vis the task of continuing the war.
We have seen over the last months that more and more Ukrainians when asked whether they would be willing to accept territorial concessions in potential negotiations with Russia would agree to them, because they do not see the continuation of the war as tolerable anymore.
I struggle to find any civil society actors who would represent those views. Those views are not represented, and I am not saying that they should be. I am just making an empirical observation that the actors who would try to express those views often have come under suspicion by the security officers and others as people who undermine the internal stability of Ukraine.
Civil society is acting within a slightly narrower set of problems and institutional channels than I think had been the case before. I think that is absolutely understandable. It can be explained by the fact that by and large they have mobilized in support of Ukraine’s conduct of the war, and they do not question the overall goals or the need to prosecute the war, et cetera, et cetera.
Their work is limited to making Ukraine’s governmental decisions and policies with regard to the war and internal governance more efficient and effective. You can see that with anti-corruption activists most clearly.
You mentioned centralization, and I think that is very important. One thing that we ought to talk about when we talk about centralization is the way in which the Zelensky administration is seeking to centralize its power through digitalization and taking direct control over executive functions. Not least because Ukraine has become more deeply dependent on Western power, specifically for military and fiscal support. It is of vital importance for the government to try to control the way in which it is seen outside of Ukraine and the way in which it controls the disbursement of funds and military material inside the country. Ukraine’s dependence on the West structurally drives centralization and that is something that inevitably pits the government at odds with local authorities and local civil society. We have seen claims made by mayors, for example, Andriy Sadovay, who most recently in Ukrainska Pravda, said that he thinks that central authorities see or approach local authorities as though they were enemies rather than people in the same boat, with whom they should cooperate.
Sasha Kokhan
We have touched once again on the idea of centralization, but we should talk about elections a little bit more. The question is whether the elections are possible and, if so, under which circumstances.
Sergiy Kudelia
I would say obviously the elections would be possible. There are certain conditions under which elections could be possible again. The number one condition is the level of safety, and we understand that in Ukraine there is a variation in the level of safety across the country.
Certain regions in Ukraine obviously are more safe than others. None of the regions are fully safe from Russian attacks, but there is a growing expression of new ideas about the possibility of local elections or regional elections in certain areas where the safety concerns are not as high as they are in other regions.
I think one way in which we can reintroduce elections in the Ukrainian political system is by attempting to hold a set of local elections later in the year. That is what I heard about the time schedule. That would signal to our foreign partners that Ukraine is not an autocracy and will remain a democracy despite everything that is happening right now. It is an important signal externally, but it also is an important signal to its own voters, because society, as I mentioned earlier, needs to express a lot of discontent that has accumulated over the last three years with both the national government and the local governments. Elections are one of the instruments that allows us to release that tension within society. Otherwise, this tension can be released in other, more destructive ways, and we do not want to see that. I would argue that this is the first step. As to the national elections, my main concern is the possibility of holding digital elections through various kinds of apps, which is being discussed as a possibility. Obviously, we have an issue with millions of Ukrainians who live outside of Ukraine and may not be returning to participate in the electoral process, so they should have an opportunity to vote as well. We talk about at least a million active duty soldiers, who also should have an opportunity to vote, and there are questions about how exactly you can provide that. I think if you introduce the digital component into the elections, that may undermine the credibility of the election and trust in the electoral outcome. There should be other means, by which we can bring these other voters into the electoral process.
Taras Fedirko
I think the problem of elections is something that the government is clearly thinking about. It is something that for good reason has been floated by political commentators in Ukraine and people close to the authorities.
That means that they perceive that they require elections for renewed legitimacy. However, legal and simply technical conditions for holding nationwide or local elections are absent.
I do not think that the government knows even how many people there are in the country, how to construct a credible case for legitimate turnout, and so on and so forth. We do not even know whether the government would have enough votes in the parliament in order to introduce constitutional amendments necessary for holding elections during martial law.
Talking about elections under conditions of war would change if martial law is suspended after the end of the war or after some form of cessation of hostilities. Again, the outcome of the war is the biggest unknown in this situation.
Sasha Kokhan
I was wondering if we could talk a bit about the domestic politics in Ukraine, its relation to the war, and how much this case is special. What comparisons could be drawn with other countries that could help us see the situation clearer? We often talk about Ukraine as if our situation is specific.
Sergiy Kudelia
I think there are many examples of democracies that have been fighting wars. I lived in one of those democracies, in the United States, while it was fighting multiple wars outside, but one can argue that it was an aggressor state rather than a target of external aggression. The uniqueness of the Ukrainian case is that we are dealing with a country that is partially occupied, that is fighting an active war on its own territory, that is fighting against an authoritarian state.
We have a democratic state or at least partially democratic fighting an autocracy on its own territory. We also have most of the territory that is not occupied and where basically life continues: basic institutions are still functioning and governance continues.
This, I think, is the uniqueness of Ukraine’s case. I would say that in any examples of democracies that are fighting wars, there are certain restrictions that are imposed by the government, for example, what can be covered in media, and what cannot be covered.
There are also certain inevitable changes in public opinion that happen and in the case of Ukraine, obviously, the change in public opinion is the issue of safety and security is the top priority of any citizen. Most of the other concerns became secondary, and if we imagine in the near future that any kind of political or electoral process can be revived, it will probably center on exactly the topic of security and safety.
From this standpoint, I think examples of other democracies demonstrate that there is a greater demand for new political actors that may be affiliated withthe security services or with the military. We saw examples of countries that experienced wars, as in the case of the United States, where generals became presidents or key military veterans, that is prominent figures, and took important positions within the government because these are the individuals that have the highest trust within the society, and they can credibly promise on the issues of the greatest importance for voters. That I think are some of the lessons that we can draw from other cases.
Taras Fedirko
When we talk about comparing Ukraine to other countries I think we can broaden what it is that we are comparing. One thing where Ukraine is absolutely similar to many states at war is the way in which the state itself has transformed.
Last year Ukrainians and Ukrainian companies paid the most taxes ever. This is something that is typically to be expected when the state seeks to intensify the mobilization of resources from from society that it governs in order to pay for war. Ukraine has been engaged in constructing a kind of fiscal military state where it uses taxes alongside foreign loans and grants in order to pay for the war. The issue of efficient use of those taxes becomes an efficient use of spending and the prosecution of the war becomes a point of socio-political contestation between constituent forces of that society. In that sense, Ukraine is undergoing something akin to a classic process of war-making and state-making, if you will, except that you can observe that process in the short term as opposed to the long term that has been studied by people like Charles Tilly and proponents of the Bellicist camp of historical sociology. In that sense, Ukraine is absolutely similar to many other states across the world throughout history.
Sasha Kokhan
Thank you for this wonderful conversation.
The conversation was recorded in Budapest at the Winter School of the Invisible University for Ukraine. This is the edited version of the recording.