The year 2024 was meant to be the year of democracy. In the largest election year in the history of the world, nearly half of humanity, some three and a half billion people, were able to cast votes in 72 countries. As the year progressed, commentators pointed out that an unusually high proportion of incumbents were removed from office and that voters tended to shift to the right in numerous countries.
The debate now centers on whether 2024 was good or bad for democracy. In terms of the long-term effects of the 2024 elections on democracy, much will obviously depend on how the winners will fare in office. In “Democracy After 2024,” the new series at the Review of Democracy, leading experts offer insights into 2024 as a seminal year for global democracy and its significance for the years ahead, examining trends we should fear and showing where hope lies for a more democratic future.
Arina Kravchenko
You are listening to the “Democracy After 2022 series.” My name is Arina Kravchenko, I am a literary editor, reviewer, and journalist. Today, I am with the one and only Mykola Repchuk, a Ukrainian journalist, publicist, poet, translator, columnist, and prominent intellectual figure.
Mykola, in your collection of essays, The Nationalist Lexicon, speaking about the great political diversity of the Maidan, you compare the attack on Ukrainian identity with the attack on democracy. How would you describe the fate of democracy after 2022, the most explicit and aggressive attack on Ukrainian identity? Has the state of democracy been transforming during these three years as much as the state of Ukrainian society?
Mykola Riabchuk
First of all, I must explain that the connection between national identity and democracy is not that obvious and straightforward, but in the Ukrainian case it’s very important. I believe that Ukrainian identity is very closely tied to the ideas and values of democracy. Generally, we must understand that identity is not something fixed, not something given forever. It is a daily process. Every day we identify ourselves with certain things, with some values. These values can be very different—often, especially for Ukrainians, it is their language and culture, because they were banned for years and erased in some cases. People also identify themselves with some symbols and institutions, and democracy, of course, is also a kind of institution.
In the case of Ukraine, historically, democracy played a role because of the fundamental image of Cossacks as freedom fighters that largely refers to the idea of democracy. It is a semi-mythical story because Cossack military democracy was a very peculiar kind of democracy, but it was democracy.
This idea is deeply entrenched in the Ukrainian notion of themselves as part of identity. This largely explains why Ukrainians, despite all the totalitarian influences, are still committed to the idea of democracy. This also explains why Ukraine is so different from Russia despite a very long so-called “common history.”
So, first of all, there are very important historical reasons as democracy is part of self-identification. Secondly, Ukrainians associate themselves, at least at the normative level, with democratic values, because they want to emphasize that they are a European nation, and democracy is a dominant value in the European Union.
This also helps Ukrainians to distance themselves from Russia. The persistent Ukrainian problem of being often confused with Russia internationally, so Ukrainians try to stress that they are different. Russia is increasingly authoritarian, today it is a totalitarian state, and Ukraine is still democratic despite everything: alleged affinity, alleged similarity, alleged common heritage, and so on. We are absolutely different, and democracy is one of the proofs of this difference. There were at least two very important reasons to maintain this commitment to democracy. Since independence despite the deeply entrenched oligarchic system that tried to derail Ukraine from the democratic path of development, Ukrainians are still committed to democratic values, and they were able to defend them either during the Orange Revolution, or Euromaidan, or now when we have faced a direct military invasion. In all these cases, it is not only about independence or sovereignty but also about democracy.
Both revolutions in Ukraine were democratic revolutions. In 2004 and 2014, people resisted the government’s attempt to change the way of development of Ukraine in a way similar to Russia or Belarus. People were able to defend democracy, both in 2004 and 2014, and now they are doing the same on a larger scale, because we understand that the threat from Putin’s Russia is a threat to democracy. We know what kind of system is there in Moscow, and we definitely do not want to have the same in Ukraine.
Arina Kravchenko
We talk about democracy not as something that we rapidly gained but as a long-term process. It is interesting how this long-term democratic tradition was influenced by the long-term incorporation of Ukraine into the Soviet state. What do you think about that?
Mykola Riabchuk
I mentioned the Cossack tradition, which was important for the democratic heritage of Ukrainians. Of course, there was also a backside in this tradition, because it was a military democracy and not a liberal democracy. We still have problems with liberalism. Democracy is not a problem in Ukraine, but liberalism is, as well as the rule of law, because we never had a deep tradition of the rule of law. This very often makes democracy dysfunctional, because a democracy that is not firmly based on the rule of law becomes a little bit chaotic and compromises itself. This is what we have faced in Ukraine for the last 30 years, and we are still trying to fix this problem.
Democracy is not properly institutionalized in Ukraine. Nonetheless, we are strongly committed to democracy, and this can be observed in various opinion surveys. In a recent lecture at the IUFU Winter School, Gwendolyn Sasse referenced opinion surveys carried out by Olga Onuch and Henry Hale. The result of these surveys shows a very unusual phenomenon that in Ukraine people’s commitment to democracy increased in times of crisis. It is very unusual because in situations of deep crisis, people tend to rely more on authoritarian rulers, on so a so-called “strong hand.” It is rather a typical trend, and Ukraine was exceptional in this regard. Ukrainians became more sympathetic to democracy during the COVID crisis, and now, despite the war, or maybe because of the war, they have become even more pro-democratic. Sociological surveys confirm this commitment.
Olga Onuch explains this by the fact that democracy really works. Ukrainians had a chance to notice that the democratic system is not so bad and is able to encounter and fight this crisis. This is true to some degree, but I have a different explanation. I believe it is also part of our rallying around the flag. Ukrainians are mobilized and strive to defend their independence, their country, and their nation against a very heavily authoritarian aggressor. This is another reason to emphasize their democratic character and show that they fight not just an alien state that invaded them but also an authoritarian state that is trying to introduce its own system and dismantle the Ukrainian democratic system. Ukrainians are trying to prove that they defend not only people, territory, cities, factories, and what not but also our culture, language, and political system.
Arina Kravchenko
You mentioned that support for authoritarian regimes as the response to the crisis is something very common. Ukraine in this sense is a very unusual case. How far can we get in conceptualizing Ukraine as a democracy phenomenon?
Mykola Riabchuk
I believe that today we observe something like a global discovery of Ukraine, at least in the first world. It has appeared on the global mental maps relatively recently, probably since independence. Still, there were a lot of questions about whether Ukraine is really so much different from Russia: “Do you have a distinct language? Do you have your own culture or literature?” I had been asked these questions quite often in different corners of the globe. Now it has changed, and it is maybe belated recognition, but it is there. What we see now is that Ukrainian studies cease to be diaspora studies as they used to be, before Ukraine’s independence when virtually no foreigners were engaged, as it was not considered a serious area of research. Now, there are a lot of foreign citizens of no Ukrainian origin who are engaged in Ukrainian studies: politics or literature, culture, or sociology. Maybe it is not a mainstream trend, but it is very positive that Ukrainian studies are no longer a “ghettoized” phenomenon but are a field of study like any other, as Polish or Czech studies. Of course, you can catalyze this interest because something is going on in this corner of the world—probably, the most important event of the last half a century at least. A little surprise there is a high interest in Ukraine and so many publications, articles, and books, both in scholarly periodicals, but also in mass media, journals, and magazines about Ukraine.
Of course, these publications are of different quality, and there are a lot of misunderstandings that might disappoint us. For example, one of the most unexpected things probably was the lack of support for Ukraine in the so-called “Global South.”
Sanctions against Russia were not introduced globally; they were only introduced by the collective West, partially by Japan and South Korea. Again, it is surprising, because Ukrainians expected much higher solidarity and broader support, and that the countries of the so-called Global South would understand the colonial character of our struggle, because they have their own colonial past and struggles with colonial empires. Apparently, they do not understand that Russia was an empire, and we also have unfinished colonial work. For me, it was one of my major disappointments because, frankly speaking, I expected much stronger global solidarity with Ukraine.
On the other hand, there was a very positive development, because finally Ukraine appeared not just on the mental map, but also as a country with its own agency, political will, identity, sovereignty, and its own right to survive and live independently. This probably affects the entire perception of the region, because all these East European nations for centuries were perceived as non-historical nations, as peripheral countries, which are doomed to be dependent on some sovereigns and be the playgrounds of other empires. Ukraine specifically suffered from this misperception. Ukraine’s resilience strongly changed this perception. Not everybody was happy that Ukraine resisted, and some people would like Ukraine to capitulate and sign whatever peace agreement with Moscow, but nonetheless they have to recognize that Ukraine has agency. Ukraine is not just a pawn, which can be manipulated by strong powers; it has its own will and its own values. We enter a new situation when Ukraine becomes a country to be counted. I hope that Ukraine not only survives, but will be able to capitalize on this newly acquired international attention, respect, and empathy.
Arina Kravchenko
At the same time, we have this notion of returning and rediscovering Ukraine again and again: first in 1991, then after the Orange Revolution, after Euromaidan when Ukraine suddenly became visible but this visibility just faded away, and Ukraine again became a Russian neighboring country. Do you think it is going to happen again? Are we talking about so-called hypothetical solidarity or real solidarity with Ukraine?
Mykola Riabchuk
It is a very sad question. As some Western diplomat put it long ago, Ukraine never loses a chance to lose a chance. This is what happened after the Orange Revolution and, to some degree, after Euromaidan. Both revolutions were successful in the sense that they prevented Ukrainians from sliding back into authoritarianism and turning in Moscow’s direction. But they did not achieve the highest goals of radical reform of the country and radical Europeanization. We still have this problem on our agenda, but so far the issue of international solidarity is more daunting.
Personally, I understand that all people may have different reasons to express solidarity with other nations. One reason is normative. If people are committed to the same values, they try to defend them elsewhere, especially if these values are under attack.
This is what we observe in Western Europe, especially in Scandinavian countries. Probably, it is connected to protestant ethics, because it is not incidentally that all these nations who are the most supportive of Ukraine belong not just to Western tradition, but also to the protestant tradition of Christianity.
The other reason for solidarity might be much more mundane—the ability to imagine yourselves in the same situation and put yourself in the shoes of Ukrainians. This requires some imagination, empathy, and also maybe some similar historical experiences.
In this regard, we could expect major solidarity from Eastern European nations, which were deprived of their sovereignty and suffered the same subjugation from the Russian Empire and eventually from the Soviet Union. Most of them were occupied by the Soviets twice or three times. We could expect that these nations would have a much better understanding of Ukraine, and to some degree, this is the case in the Baltic states, Poland, and the Czech Republic, but for some reason not in Slovakia or Hungary.
This is a problem, which requires more detailed research. Maybe, in the case of Hungary, it is connected with some resentment towards the West, which did not support Hungarians in 1956, when Hungary was in a similar situation, asked for support, and was betrayed.
International solidarity with Ukraine is not unanimous, unfortunately, and we still have a lot of space to deliver our messages and educate people.
Arina Kravchenko
Thank you for this insightful conversation.
The conversation was recorded in Budapest at the Winter School of the Invisible University for Ukraine. This is the edited version of the recording.